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ConstitutionalLaw
RIGHTS OF COMMUNIST ALIENS

SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION

Introduction
A current problem facing our courts today concerns the rights
of resident aliens who are subject to deportation from the United
States because they are, or have been members of the Communist
party. That these aliens have many rights in our country is
indisputable since they are allowed to live here and own property, but these rights are subject always to the right of the
United States to deport them on showing of sufficient cause.
Perhaps the alien entered the United States illegally, or commits
a crime involving moral turpitude, or is a person who is an
enemy of our form of government. These reasons, with qualifications and other reasons, entitle the Immigration Board to order
such aliens deported, and the Attorney General is authorized to
carry out the order. An alien who is ordered deported has always
had a limited right of appeal to the courts, but the scope of the
review has always been limited in these cases.
I
Since the Chinese Exclusion Act of 18881 and a supplementary
act 2 were passed by Congress, aliens who have been ordered
deported and have thereupon been taken into custody, have
appealed to the courts of the United States on writs of habeas
corpus. The first aliens to appeal orders of deportation in such
manner were denied relief by the Supreme Court.3 An act in
19074 providing for the deportation of alien prostitutes also provoked litigation when an alien seized under its provisions and
those of an amendment of '19105 appealed to the Supreme Court
by the traditional remedy of writ of habeas corpus.( She too was
1 25 STAT. 504, c. 1064 (1888). This Act was declared constitutional in The
Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
2

27 STAT. 25, c. 60 (1892).

* Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
* 34 STAT. 898, 899, c. 1134 (1907).
* 36 STAT. 263, c. 128 (1910).
* Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
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denied relief, the Court finding that it was within the power
of Congress to provide for deportation when the presence of an
alien is detrimental to the welfare of the country. Since these
early, successful efforts to set up grounds on which to deport
resident aliens, Congress has added to the grounds for deportation. In 1918, Congress deemed it sufficient for deportation if an
alien taught or advocated the violent overthrow of the Government or even belonged to an organization so advocating or teaching overthrow of the Government.7 By subsequent acts in 1950s
and 1952,) past or present membership in the Communist party
by an alien was made sufficient reason to deport him. The problems in the modern case of deporting an alien as a Communist
are (a) the proof needed to deport the alien, (b) the right of
judicial review for the alien and (c) his right to bail pending
final order or deportation.
Proof Needed
In 1939, the Supreme Court held 10 that by the act of 1918,
providing for deportation of an alien Who advocated or belonged
to an organization that advocated overthrow of the Government
by force or violence, past membership in a forbidden organization could not be grounds for deportation. The evidence must
establish present membership in order to deport an unnaturalized
resident. Membership in the Communist party had been consistently considered as strong evidence of an alien's advocacy of
the forbidden doctrine of overthrowing the Government.
In 1939, after the Kessler case,:" the Communist party "expelled" all aliens solely to protect them from deportation under
the Kessler doctrine. In answer to this move, Congress in 1940
passed the Alien Registration Act'5 providing that past membership in an organization advocating forceful overthrow of the
Government was sufficient grounds for deportation of an alien.
Moreover, for the first time, Congress removed all time limits
within which the Government had to move against the alien
after his membership.
7 40 STAT. 1012 (1918), 8 U.S.C. §137 (1952) (later repealed by 66 STAT.
279 (1952) ). The 1918 Act supplemented the more important Act of 1917.
Cf. Note 31, infra.
8 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§781-826 (1952).
9 66 STAT. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1503 (1952).

10 Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
I1 Ibid.
12 54 STAT. 670, 8 U.S.C. §137 (1940).
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The Alien Registration Act was upheld in an attack made on
it by three aliens who had been ordered deported for their
past communist affiliations. 3 The aliens contended that the act
violated the ex post facto provision' 4 and the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution. Due process, guaranteed by the fifth
amendment, was held not applicable because regulation of entrance and deportation of aliens is a political matter &orCongress
alone. The first amendment does not protect those who incite
and advocate the violent overthrow of the government. Finally,
in the tradition of previous cases, 15 the Court ruled that deportation was a civil proceeding, and that the ex post facto provisions
in the Constitution applied only to criminal proceedings.
In 1950 Congress passed the Internal Security Act' 6 which,
for the first time, expressly designated past or present membership in the Communist party by an alien as sufficient cause in
itself for deportation. The Act was held constitutional in Galvan
v. Press,1 7 in which a Mexican, who had entered the United
States in 1918, was ordered deported for his past affiliations with
the Communist party. The Court held that membership in the
Party made sufficient grounds for deportation of an alien, and
there need be no proof that the alien knew the aims of the organization. But if one is ordered deported for membership in
Communist-front organizations, the Act requires that proof must
be given that the alien was not merely duped into joining the
organizations.' 8
By the Act of 1950, Congress recognized the subversive and
13 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952).
14 U. S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 3.
15 Some earlier cases holding this doctrine were Bugajewitz v. Adams,

229 U.S. 585 (1913); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149
(1923) (deportation is a civil proceeding and he can be compelled to testify
to his alienage.) Cf. recent case, United States ex rel. Circella v. Sabli, 216
F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954). (Deportation is a civil action and therefore not cruel
and unusual punishment). Compare also the first case of an alien appealing
to the courts for review of his deportation. Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
16 Note 8, supra.
17 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
18 Id. at 526-529 (dictum).
19 64 STAT. 987, c. 1024 §2(1) (1950), 50 U.S.C. §781 (1952). "There exists a world Communist movement which, in its origins, its development,
and its present practice, is a world-wide revolutionary movement whose
purpose it is by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental or otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terriorism, and any other means
deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the
countries throughout the world through the medium of a world-wide Communist organization."
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unlawful character of the Communist party19 and also that any
alien member of the party is by that fact alone subject to deportation as one who advocates overthrowing the government by
force and violence.20 The Act avoids the necessity of repetitious
proof of these matters in case after case, and much time is now
saved in every such case.21 Since the passage of this Act, therefore, the United States need prove only that the resident alien
is or was at any time a member of the Communist party, and
that fact alone, having been established, is reason enough to
order his deportation.
Right of Judicial Review
Until 1946, it was generally admitted that the only correct
and successful method for an alien to obtain judicial review of
his deportation order by the Board of Immigration appeals was
by writ of habeas corpus. This method involves hardship for the
alien because he must wait until the Attorney General has taken
him into custody before he can invoke the habeas corpus
remedy.22 With the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
in 1946,
a new method of obtaining judicial review seemed
possible. But was the Administrative Procedure Act intended
to apply to deportation proceedings? Many lawyers thought it
did.24 In United States ex. rel. Trinler v. Carusi,.25 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that under
the Act an alien was entitled to judicial review of a deportation
ruling after the order had been promulgated but before he
had been taken into custody. At that time the remedy of habeas
corpus was not available to petitioner and the court allowed him
to bring the action under a novel form of "Petition for Review."
But the same court 28 later ordered the judgment be vacated
and the case remanded with orders to dismiss the cause as abated
20 Deportation is a political matter and it is within the power of Congress to deal with aliens. A provision which makes membership in the
Communist party grounds for deportation is not violative of due process.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
21 See Note, 29 NoTRa DA= LAw. 97 (1953) on the wisdom of the courts
taking judicial notice of the aims of the Communist party.
22 There is a discussion of the hardships suffered by the alien in such
cases by Orlow, Deportation Under the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, 22 Tamp. L. Q. 74 (1948).
23 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1001 (Supp. 1952).
24 Orlow, supra note 22.
25 166 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1948), discussed by Orlow, supra note 22.
'2. United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 168 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1948). See a
discussion of this latter Trinler case in Wolf v. Boyd, 87 F. Supp. 906 (W.D.
Wash. 1949).
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in accord with an earlier Supreme Court case,27 which held that
the motion must be made to continue the suit against a successor
in office within a six months period after appointment. 28 Other
courts, however, agreed with the first Trinier decision, 29 but the
Supreme Court,30 in a later case, held that deportation orders
were immune from direct attack and the only remedy open
to an alien was the writ of habeas corpus. Further, the Immigration Act of 191731 makes the decision of the Attorney General
"final," and this was held to preclude judicial review under the
first exception to §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
In 1952 Congress replaced the old Immigration Act with the
Immigration and Nationality Act.32 The Supreme Court has re-

cently affirmed, by a split vote, a decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that the
new Act provided for judicial review of final deportation orders
Judgment
through suit by the alien either under the Declaratory
34
ss
Act or the Administrative Procedure Act. The court said:
Unlike the 1917 Act, §§242 (c) and 242(e) of the 1952 Act expressly
recognize that there may be "judicial review" of a final order of
deportation. Section 242 (c) provides "... or if judicial review is
had..."
Judicial review is not synonymous with habeas corpus. Nothing in
§242 (c) restricts it to habeas corpus. (Emphasis added)

Two other cases are found that agree with this decision.35 But
in Batista v. Nicolls,36 the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has held even more recently that the 1952 Act did
not make judicial review available under either the Declaratory
Judgment Act or the Administrative Procedure Act. The court
27 United States ex rel. Claussen v. Curran, 276 U.S. 590 (1928).

2S Carusi resigned his office and Miller replaced him on August 27, 1947.
No attempt was made to substitute Miller until nearly nine months had
elapsed.
29 Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Prince v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1950).
30 Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953). The Court in its decision also
held that the alien could not appeal under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U.S.C. §2201.
31 39 STAT. 874 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1103.
32 66 STAT. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1503 (1952).
33 Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd. by -an
equally divided Court 346 U.S. 929 (1954).
34 Id. at 452. (Emphasis added.)
35 Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy, 213 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1954); Aguilera-Flores
v. Landon, 125 F.Supp. 55 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
36 213 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1954).
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said that the affirmation of Rubinstein v. Brownell by an equally
divided court did not make that decision authoritative precedent.
The court held that the new Act in retaining the clause t3hat
the Attorney General's decision shall be final, affirmed the
existing law that the deportation orders were not subject to
direct attack.
Batista v. Nicolls can be distinguished from Rubinstein v.
Brownell, in that in the former case the deportation order was
issued before the 1952 Act went into effect, while Rubinstein's
order was issued five days after the Act became effective. The
distinction, however, did not play an important part in the
Batista decision.
Right to Bail
Under the National Security Act of 1950 and the subsequent
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that replaced the former, the Attorney General is given discretion to determine
whether an alien shall be released on bail while his deportation
37
proceedings aie being held under the Act. In Carisonv. Landon,
the Supreme Court interpreting the 1950 Act held that the
Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying bail
to an alien when the reason for the Attorney General denying
bail was that the alien was an active member of the Communist
party. The Court thought that the evidence was sufficient that
the Attorney General was acting in the best interest of the nation and was not arbitrary or capricious in his refusal to grant
bail. The Court said: 38
... [We conclude that the discretion as to bail in the Attorney
General was certainly broad enough to justify his detention of all
these parties without bail as a menace to the public interest. As all
alien Communists are deportable, like Anarchists, because of Congress understanding of their attitude toward the use of force and
violence in such a constitutional democracy as ours to accomplish
their political aims, evidence of membership plus personal activity in
supporting and extending the Party's philosophy concerning violence
gives adequate ground for detention.

The Court thus affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and reversed a case in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that had decided contrary to this
decision.3 9

a7 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
38

Id. at 541.

38

Butterfield v. Zydok, 187 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1951), reversed 342 US.

859.
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H
In several of the cases cited above the Supreme Court has
been evenly split or had only a bare majority of five.4° The dissenters, in most of these cases, indicate that they consider the
treatment of alien members of the Communist party in our
courts today as too harsh, and claim that judicial attitude toward
this group should be more like that toward citizens in keeping
41
with the humanitarian principles of this country and age.
These dissenters often argue on broad moral and philosophical
grounds rather than on legal grounds, citing usually very few
cases that support their views. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, inferred that the Alien Registration
Act of 1940 was unconstitutional in allowing deportation for
past membership in a forbidden organization, said: 4
The right to be immune from arbitrary decrees of banishment cer-

tainly may be more important to 'liberty" than the civil rights which
all aliens enjoy when they reside here. Unless they are free from
arbitrary banishment, the "liberty" they enjoy while they live here
is indeed illusory. Banishment is punishment in the practical sense. It
may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life worth while.
Those who have their roots here have an important stake in this
country. Their plans for themselves and their hopes for their children
all depend on their right to stay. If they are uprooted and sent to lands
no longer known to them, no longer hospitable, they become displaced,
homeless people condemned to bitterness and despair.

These are thought provoking words indeed, and one can easily
picture a huge policeman, with a black band around his arm,
interrupting a family prayer to wrest away the sad father from
his weeping wife and children. Yet, what were the facts in the
Harisiades case? The alien had entered this country in 1916
from Greece. Although he made his home here, he evidently
never found United States citizenship worth the bother of the
naturalization process. On the contrary, he chose to be a Communist party member in 1925 and was active until his expulsion,
with other aliens, from the party in 1939 after the Kessler decision. His views remained unchanged, however, as he continued
his associatIon with members of the party. A warrant for his
deportation was issued in 1930, but he was not located until
1946 because of his use of aliases. At the time of trial he still
40 Rubinstein v. Brownell, supra, note 33; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952). Cf. also Martinez v. Neely, 197 F.2d 462, aff'd 344 U.S. 916 (1953).
41 See the dissent of Justice Black in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 547
(1952).
42

342 U.S. at 600.
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professed his Communist beliefs. 43 What had Harisiades and
other aliens affected by the Act of 1940 and subsequent Acts
done to merit even the hearings they were given before the
courts of the country they had not even shown an interest in
adopting?
Unlike the dissenters in the Harisiades case who thought the
lot of Communist aliens too harsh, Congress, with more than
three decades of experience with the Immigration Act of 1917,
thought the danger from the Communist party to be so great as
to warrant a law in 1950 making the very membership by an
alien, past or present, in the party sufficient grounds for deportation. Congress, moreover, showed in this law its belief that there
was no need to prove the aims of the Communist party when
voluminous testimony in previous cases had shown those aims
satisfactorily. 44 The Court has been wise in respecting the decision

of Congress in determining what proof is necessary to justify
the deportation of an alien with subversive affiliations. In passing these laws, Congress has reiterated the traditional law- that
has consistently held that a sovereign may expel an alien nearly
at will. 45 Under this concept of what it could do, Congress has
been lenient, moving slowly and only after it felt there was a great
need.
Whether Congress actually intended to give an alien judicial
review from a deportation order, other than that of habeas
corpus, in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is doubtful. In making such a departure from the past tradition of law
in this country, Congress would probably be specific. Although,
as the United States Court of Appeals points out in Rubinstein
v. Brownell, there are some references to judicial review in the
1952 Act that were not present in the 1917 Act, still the 1952 Act
goes on to refer to no other judicial review except that of habeas
corpus, which is mentioned expressly several times in the Act.46
43 These facts are given at 342 U.S. at 582. Two other aliens before the
Court in the same case do not appear in such bad light as does Harisiades,
yet the conduct of the other two shows extreme indifference, at the very
least, to the continued existence of the United States Government.
44 CJ. United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
45 Note 15, supra. But note the dissent of Justice Brewer in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
46 66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. §1252 (a) and (c) (1952).
47 66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. §1252 (a) (1952) provides in part: "Any Court
of competent jurisdiction shall have authority to review or revise any
determination of the Attorney General concerning detention, release on
bond, or parole pending final decision of deportability upon a conclusive
showing in habeas corpua proceedings that the Attorney General is not
proceeding with such reasonable dispatch...." (Emphasis added.)
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The reasonable inference to be taken is that Congress meant only
habeas corpus when it said judicial review, for the two terms
4
are used together in the same sections nearly simultaneously. 7
Moreover, as the Court points out in Batista v. Nicofls, 48 the
clause, primary in interpretive importance, that the decision of
the Attorney General shall be final, is still present in the 1952
Act.4 9 Legislative history of the Act is inconclusive, for definite
proposals to limit judicial review to habeas corpus and to extend
it were both defeated.5 0
On the question of the Attorney General granting bail to
alien Communists while their deportation proceedings are pending, one need only look at the provision in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 that makes the granting of such bail
discretionary with the Attorney General. 51 As pointed out by
the Court in Carlson v. Landon,52 the Attorney General can
scarcely be said to be abusing that discretion in deciding after
review of documentary proof, that the alien is an active Communist party member, or one equally inimical to the interests of
the United States, that the granting of bail would be harmful
to the best interests of the United States.
Conclusion
In dealing with the problems involving the rights of Communist aliens in this country, one should always remember
that these people are aliens and are not legally entitled to enjoy,
equally with citizens, all the rights extended by the United
States to its citizens. These Communist aliens have chosen at
some time to pledge their allegiance to a doctrine opposed to the
very existence of the United States Government, which Government, like every government, was founded primarily to safeguard the interests and rights of its citizens. That is its very
raison d'etre. The words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter are significant: 53 "It is not for this Court to reshape a world order based
on politically- sovereign states."*
Joseph B. Joyce
213 F.2d 20 (1st. Cir. 1954).
66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. §1252 (b) (1952).
50 The legislative history of the Act is discussed in Rubinstein v. Brownell, supra, 206 F.2d at 454-55.
51 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (1952).
52 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
53 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra, 342 US. at 596 (concurring opinion).
* On April 25,1955, the Supreme Court held in a 6-3 decision in Pedreiro
v. Shaughnessy, cited in note 35, supra, that deportation orders may be
reviewed by the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court
held that nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was to the
contrary. 23 U.S.L. W=s 4190 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1955).
48
49

